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U.S. Supreme Court   60 U.S. 393 (How.)
DRED SCOTT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, 
v. 
JOHN F. A. SANDFORD.
December Term, 1856
It was argued at December term, 1855, and ordered to be reargued at 
the present term. It was now argued by Mr. Blair and Mr. G. F. Curtis 
for the plaintiff  in error, and by Mr. Geyer and Mr. Johnson for the 
defendant in error. Th e reporter regrets that want of room will not al-
low him to give the arguments of counsel; but he regrets it the less, 
because the subject is thoroughly examined in the opinion of the court, 
the opinions of the concurring judges, and the opinions of the judges 
who dissented from the judgment of the court.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.
[. . . ]
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Th e parties agreed to the following facts: In the year 1834, the 
plaintiff  was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a sur-
geon in the army of the United States. In that year, Dr. Emerson took 
the plaintiff  from the State of Missouri to the post of Rock Island, in 
the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of 
April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, Dr. Emerson removed 
the plaintiff  from Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, sit-
uate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the territory Known 
as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situ-
ate north of latitude thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north 
of the State of Missouri. Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff  in slavery, at 
Fort Snelling, from the last-mentioned date until the year 1838. 
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the 
plaintiff ’s declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who be-
longed to the army of the United States. In that year, Major Taliaferro 
took Harriet to Fort Snelling, a military post situated as hereinbefore 
stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold 
and delivered her as a slave, at Fort Snelling, unto Dr. Emerson, who 
held her in slavery, at that place, until the year 1838. 
In the year 1836, the plaintiff  and Harriet were married at Fort 
Snelling, with the consent of Dr. Emerson, who claimed to be their 
master and owner. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the 
plaintiff ’s declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about 
fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north 
of the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Missis-
sippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Mis-
souri, at the military post called Jeff erson Barracks. 
In the year 1838, Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff  and said Har-
riet and their daughter Eliza from Fort Snelling to the State of Mis-
souri, where they have ever since resided. 
Before the commencement of the suit, Dr. Emerson sold and con-
veyed the plaintiff , Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as 
slaves, and he has ever since claimed to hold them as slaves. 
At the times mentioned in the plaintiff ’s declaration, the defendant, 
claiming to be the owner, laid his hands upon said plaintiff , Harriet, 
Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them; doing in this respect, however, 
John McLean’s Dissent 
in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856) *
Mr. Justice McLEAN dissenting. 
This case is before us on a writ of error from the Circuit Court for the district of Missouri. 
An action of trespass was brought, which charges the defendant with 
an assault and imprisonment of the plaintiff , and also of Harriet Scott, 
his wife, Eliza and Lizzie, his two children, on the ground that they 
were his slaves, which was without right on his part, and against law. 
Th e defendant fi led a plea in abatement, “that said causes of action, 
and each and every of them, if any such accrued to the said Dred Scott, 
accrued out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri, for that to wit, said 
plaintiff , Dred Scott, is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged 
in his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent, his ances-
tors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country 
and sold as negro slaves; and this the said Sandford is ready to verify; 
wherefore he prays judgment whether the court can or will take further 
cognizance of the action aforesaid.” 
To this a demurrer was fi led, which, on argument, was sustained by 
the court, the plea in abatement being held insuffi  cient; the defendant 
was ruled to plead over. Under this rule he pleaded: 1. Not guilty; 2. 
Th at Dred Scott was a negro slave, the property of the defendant; and 
3. Th at Harriet, the wife, and Eliza and Lizzie, the daughters of the 
plaintiff , were the lawful slaves of the defendant. 
Issue was joined on the fi rst plea, and replications of de injuria were 
fi led to the other pleas. 
* (60 U.S. 393, pp. 529– 564).
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and minors may sue in the Federal courts, and so may any individual 
who has a permanent domicile in the State under whose laws his rights 
are protected, and to which he owes allegiance. 
Being born under our Constitution and laws, no naturalization is 
required, as one of foreign birth, to make him a citizen. Th e most gen-
eral and appropriate defi nition of the term citizen is “a freeman.” Being 
a freeman, and having his domicile in a State diff erent from that of the 
defendant, he is a citizen within the act of Congress, and the courts of 
the Union are open to him. 
It has often been held, that the jurisdiction, as regards parties, can 
only be exercised between citizens of diff erent States, and that a mere 
residence is not suffi  cient; but this has been said to distinguish a tem-
porary from a permanent residence. 
To constitute a good plea to the jurisdiction, it must negative those 
qualities and rights which enable an individual to sue in the Federal 
courts. Th is has not been done; and on this ground the plea was defec-
tive, and the demurrer was properly sustained. No implication can aid 
a plea in abatement or in bar; it must be complete in itself; the facts 
stated, if true, must abate or bar the right of the plaintiff  to sue. Th is is 
not the character of the above plea. Th e facts stated, if admitted, are not 
inconsistent with other facts, which may be presumed, and which bring 
the plaintiff  within the act of Congress. 
Th e pleader has not the boldness to allege that the plaintiff  is a slave, 
as that would assume against him the matter in controversy, and em-
brace the entire merits of the case in a plea to the jurisdiction. But be-
yond the facts set out in the plea, the court, to sustain it, must assume 
the plaintiff  to be a slave, which is decisive on the merits. Th is is a short 
and an eff ectual mode of deciding the cause; but I am yet to learn that 
it is sanctioned by any known rule of pleading. 
Th e defendant’s counsel complain, that if the court take jurisdiction 
on the ground that the plaintiff  is free, the assumption is against the 
right of the master. Th is argument is easily answered. In the fi rst place, 
the plea does not show him to be a slave; it does not follow that a man 
is not free whose ancestors were slaves. Th e reports of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri show that this assumption has many exceptions; and 
there is no averment in the plea that the plaintiff  is not within them. 
no more than he might lawfully do, if they were of right his slaves at 
such times. 
In the fi rst place, the plea to the jurisdiction is not before us, on this 
writ of error. A demurrer to the plea was sustained, which ruled the 
plea bad, and the defendant, on leave, pleaded over. 
Th e decision on the demurrer was in favor of the plaintiff ; and as 
the plaintiff  prosecutes this writ of error, he does not complain of the 
decision on the demurrer. Th e defendant might have complained of 
this decision, as against him, and have prosecuted a writ of error, to re-
verse it. But as the case, under the instruction of the court to the jury, 
was decided in his favor, of course he had no ground of complaint. 
But it is said, if the court, on looking at the record, shall clearly per-
ceive that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, it is a ground for the 
dismissal of the case. Th is may be characterized as rather a sharp prac-
tice, and one which seldom, if ever, occurs. No case was cited in the ar-
gument as authority, and not a single case precisely in point is recol-
lected in our reports. Th e pleadings do not show a want of jurisdiction. 
Th is want of jurisdiction can only be ascertained by a judgment on the 
demurrer to the special plea. No such case, it is believed, can be cited. 
But if this rule of practice is to be applied in this case, and the plaintiff  
in error is required to answer and maintain as well the points ruled in his 
favor, as to show the error of those ruled against him, he has more than 
an ordinary duty to perform. Under such circumstances, the want of ju-
risdiction in the Circuit Court must be so clear as not to admit of doubt. 
Now, the plea which raises the question of jurisdiction, in my judgment, 
is radically defective. Th e gravamen of the plea is this: “Th at the plaintiff  
is a negro of African descent, his ancestors being of pure African blood, 
and were brought into this country, and sold as negro slaves.”
Th ere is no averment in this plea which shows or conduces to show 
an inability in the plaintiff  to sue in the Circuit Court. It does not al-
lege that the plaintiff  had his domicile in any other State, nor that he is 
not a free man in Missouri. He is averred to have had a negro ancestry, 
but this does not show that he is not a citizen of Missouri, within the 
meaning of the act of Congress authorizing him to sue in the Circuit 
Court. It has never been held necessary, to constitute a citizen within 
the act, that he should have the qualifi cations of an elector. Females 
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frage, and in this view have recognized them as citizens; and this has 
been done in the slave as well as the free States. On the question of cit-
izenship, it must be admitted that we have not been very fastidious. 
Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made citizens of all grades, 
combinations, and colors. Th e same was done in the admission of Lou-
isiana and Florida. No one ever doubted, and no court ever held, that 
the people of these Territories did not become citizens under the treaty. 
Th ey have exercised all the rights of citizens, without being naturalized 
under the acts of Congress. 
Th ere are several important principles involved in this case, which 
have been argued, and which may be considered under the following 
heads: 
1. Th e locality of slavery, as settled by this court and the courts of 
the States. 
2. Th e relation which the Federal Government bears to slavery in 
the States. 
3. Th e power of Congress to establish Territorial Governments, and 
to prohibit the introduction of slavery therein. 
4. Th e eff ect of taking slaves into a new State or Territory, and so 
holding them, where slavery is prohibited. 
5. Whether the return of a slave under the control of his master, 
after being entitled to his freedom, reduces him to his former 
condition. 
6. Are the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the ques-
tions before us, binding on this court, within the rule adopted. 
In the course of my judicial duties, I have had occasion to consider 
and decide several of the above points. 
1. As to the locality of slavery. Th e civil law throughout the Conti-
nent of Europe, it is believed, without an exception, is, that slavery can 
exist only within the territory where it is established; and that, if a slave 
escapes, or is carried beyond such territory, his master cannot reclaim 
him, unless by virtue of some express stipulation. (Grotius, lib. 2, chap. 
15, 5, 1; lib. 10, chap. 10, 2, 1; Wicqueposts Ambassador, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 
Martin, 385; Case of the Creole in the House of Lords, 1842; 1 Philli-
more on International Law, 316, 335.) 
By all the rules of pleading, this is a fatal defect in the plea. If there 
be doubt, what rule of construction has been established in the slave 
States? In Jacob v. Sharp, (Meigs’s Rep., Tennessee, 114,) the court held, 
when there was doubt as to the construction of a will which emanci-
pated a slave, “it must be construed to be subordinate to the higher and 
more important right of freedom.” 
No injustice can result to the master, from an exercise of jurisdic-
tion in this cause. Such a decision does not in any degree aff ect the 
merits of the case; it only enables the plaintiff  to assert his claims to 
freedom before this tribunal. If the jurisdiction be ruled against him, 
on the ground that he is a slave, it is decisive of his fate. 
It has been argued that, if a colored person be made a citizen of 
a State, he cannot sue in the Federal court. Th e Constitution declares 
that Federal jurisdiction “may be exercised between citizens of diff er-
ent States,” and the same is provided in the act of 1789. Th e above ar-
gument is properly met by saying that the Constitution was intended 
to be a practical instrument; and where its language is too plain to be 
misunderstood, the argument ends.” 
In Chirae v. Chirae, (2 Wheat., 261; 4 Curtis, 99,) this court says: 
“Th at the power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress does not 
seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, controverted.” No person 
can legally be made a citizen of a State, and consequently a citizen of 
the United States, of foreign birth, unless he be naturalized under the 
acts of Congress. Congress has power “to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization.” 
It is a power which belongs exclusively to Congress, as intimately 
connected with our Federal relations. A State may authorize foreign-
ers to hold real estate within its jurisdiction, but it has no power to nat-
uralize foreigners, and give them the rights of citizens. Such a right is 
opposed to the acts of Congress on the subject of naturalization, and 
subversive of the Federal powers. I regret that any countenance should 
be given from this bench to a practice like this in some of the States, 
which has no warrant in the Constitution. 
In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen would not be an 
agreeable member of society. Th is is more a matter of taste than of law. 
Several of the States have admitted persons of color to the right of suf-
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the reasons, occasion, and time itself, from whence it was 
created, is erased from the memory; it is of a nature that 
nothing can be suff ered to support it but positive law.”
He referred to the contrary opinion of Lord Hardwicke, in Octo-
ber, 1749, as Chancellor: “Th at he and Lord Talbot, when Attorney 
and Solicitor General, were of opinion that no such claim, as here pre-
sented, for freedom, was valid.” 
Th e weight of this decision is sought to be impaired, from the terms 
in which it was described by the exuberant imagination of Curran. Th e 
words of Lord Mansfi eld, in giving the opinion of the court, were such 
as were fi t to be used by a great judge, in a most important case. It is 
a suffi  cient answer to all objections to that judgment, that it was pro-
nounced before the Revolution, and that it was considered by this court 
as the highest authority. For near a century, the decision in Somersett’s 
case has remained the law of England. Th e case of the slave Grace, de-
cided by Lord Stowell in 1827, does not, as has been supposed, over-
rule the judgment of Lord Mansfi eld. Lord Stowell held that, during 
the residence of the slave in England, “No dominion, authority, or co-
ercion, can be exercised over him.” Under another head, I shall have oc-
casion to examine the opinion in the case of Grace. 
To the position, that slavery can only exist except under the author-
ity of law, it is objected, that in few if in any instances has it been es-
tablished by statutory enactment. Th is is no answer to the doctrine laid 
down by the court. Almost all the principles of the common law had 
their foundation in usage. Slavery was introduced into the colonies of 
this country by Great Britain at an early period of their history, and it 
was protected and cherished, until it became incorporated into the co-
lonial policy. It is immaterial whether a system of slavery was intro-
duced by express law, or otherwise, if it have the authority of law. Th ere 
is no slave State where the institution is not recognized and protected 
by statutory enactments and judicial decisions. Slaves are made prop-
erty by the laws of the slave States, and as such are liable to the claims 
of creditors; they descend to heirs, are taxed, and in the South they are 
a subject of commerce. 
In the case of Rankin v. Lydia, (2 A. K. Marshall’s Rep.,) Judge 
Mills, speaking for the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, says: “In decid-
Th ere is no nation in Europe which considers itself bound to return 
to his master a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations. 
On the contrary, the slave is held to be free where there is no treaty ob-
ligation, or compact in some other form, to return him to his master. 
Th e Roman law did now allow freedom to be sold. An ambassador or 
any other public functionary could not take a slave to France, Spain, or 
any other country of Europe, without emancipating him. A number of 
slaves escaped from a Florida plantation, and were received on board of 
ship by Admiral Cochrane; by the King’s Bench, they were held to be 
free. (2 Barn. and Cres., 440.) 
In the great and leading case of Prigg v. Th e State of Pennsylvania, 
( 16 Peters, 594; 14 Curtis, 421,) this court say that, by the general 
law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, as 
found within its territorial dominions, where it is in opposition to its 
own policy and institutions, in favor of the subjects of other nations 
where slavery is organized. If it does it, it is as a matter of comity, and 
not as a matter of international right. Th e state of slavery is deemed 
to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the 
range of the territorial laws. Th is was fully recognized in Somersett’s 
case, (Laff t’s Rep., 1; 20 Howell’s State Trials, 79,) which was decided 
before the American Revolution. 
Th ere was some contrariety of opinion among the judges on certain 
points ruled in Prigg’s case, but there was none in regard to the great 
principle, that slavery is limited to the range of the laws under which it 
is sanctioned. 
No case in England appears to have been more thoroughly exam-
ined than that of Somersett. Th e judgment pronounced by Lord Man-
sfi eld was the judgment of the Court of King’s Bench. Th e cause was 
argued at great length, and with great ability, by Hargrave and others, 
who stood among the most eminent counsel in England. It was held 
under advisement from term to term, and a due sense of its importance 
was felt and expressed by the Bench. 
In giving the opinion of the court, Lord Mansfi eld said: 
“Th e state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable 
of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but 
only by positive law, which preserves its force long after 
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power, it would follow that Congress could abolish or establish slavery 
in every State of the Union. 
Th e only connection which the Federal Government holds with 
slaves in a State, arises from that provision of the Constitution which 
declares that “No person held to service or labor in one State, under 
the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any 
law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but 
shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or la-
bor may be due.” 
Th is being a fundamental law of the Federal Government, it rests 
mainly for its execution, as has been held, on the judicial power of the 
Union; and so far as the rendition of fugitives from labor has become 
a subject of judicial action, the Federal obligation has been faithfully 
discharged. 
In the formation of the Federal Constitution, care was taken to con-
fer no power on the Federal Government to interfere with this institu-
tion in the States. In the provision respecting the slave trade, in fi xing 
the ratio of representation, and providing for the reclamation of fugi-
tives from labor, slaves were referred to as persons, and in no other re-
spect are they considered in the Constitution. 
We need not refer to the mercenary spirit which introduced the in-
famous traffi  c in slaves, to show the degradation of negro slavery in our 
country. Th is system was imposed upon our colonial settlements by the 
mother country, and it is due to truth to say that the commercial col-
onies and States were chiefl y engaged in the traffi  c. But we know as a 
historical fact, that James Madison, that great and good man, a leading 
member in the Federal Convention, was solicitous to guard the lan-
guage of that instrument so as not to convey the idea that there could 
be property in man. 
I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of 
construing the Constitution in all its bearings, rather than to look be-
hind that period, into a traffi  c which is now declared to be piracy, and 
punished with death by Christian nations. I do not like to draw the 
sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground. Our inde-
pendence was a great epoch in the history of freedom; and while I ad-
mit the Government was not made especially for the colored race, yet 
ing the question, (of slavery,) we disclaim the infl uence of the general 
principles of liberty, which we all admire, and conceive it ought to be 
decided by the law as it is, and not as it ought to be. Slavery is sanc-
tioned by the laws of this State, and the right to hold slaves under our 
municipal regulations is unquestionable. But we view this as a right ex-
isting by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in 
the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law.” 
I will now consider the relation which the Federal Government 
bears to slavery in the States: 
Slavery is emphatically a State institution. In the ninth section of 
the fi rst article of the Constitution, it is provided “that the migration 
or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 
the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, 
not exceeding ten dollars for each person.” 
In the Convention, it was proposed by a committee of eleven to 
limit the importation of slaves to the year 1800, when Mr. Pinckney 
moved to extend the time to the year 1808. Th is motion was carried-
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Georgia, voting in the affi  rmative; and New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, in the negative. In opposition to the 
motion, Mr. Madison said: “Twenty years will produce all the mischief 
that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves; so long a 
term will be more dishonorable to the American character than to say 
nothing about it in the Constitution.” (Madison Papers.) 
Th e provision in regard to the slave trade shows clearly that Con-
gress considered slavery a State institution, to be continued and regu-
lated by its individual sovereignty; and to conciliate that interest, the 
slave trade was continued twenty years, not as a general measure, but 
for the “benefi t of such States as shall think proper to encourage it.” 
In the case of Groves v. Slaughter, (15 Peters, 499; 14 Curtis, 137,) 
Messrs. Clay and Webster contended that, under the commercial 
power, Congress had a right to regulate the slave trade among the sev-
eral States; but the court held that Congress had no power to interfere 
with slavery as it exists in the States, or to regulate what is called the 
slave trade among them. If this trade were subject to the commercial 
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In May, 1787, Mr. Edmund Randolph submitted to the Federal 
Convention certain propositions, as the basis of a Federal Government, 
among which was the following: 
“Resolved, Th at provision ought to be made for the ad-
mission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the 
United States, whether from a voluntary junction of gov-
ernment and territory or otherwise, with the consent of 
a number of voices in the National Legislature less than 
the whole.”
Afterward, Mr. Madison submitted to the Convention, in order to 
be referred to the committee of detail, the following powers, as proper 
to be added to those of general legislation: “To dispose of the unap-
propriated lands of the United States. To institute temporary Govern-
ments for new States arising therein. To regulate aff airs with the Indi-
ans, as well within as without the limits of the United States.” 
Other propositions were made in reference to the same subjects, 
which it would be tedious to enumerate. Mr. Gouverneur Morris pro-
posed the following: 
“Th e Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make 
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory 
or other property belonging to the United States; and 
nothing in this Constitution contained shall be so con-
strued as to prejudice any claims either of the United 
States or of any particular State.”
Th is was adopted as a part of the Constitution, with two verbal al-
terations-Congress was substituted for Legislature, and the word either 
was stricken out. 
In the organization of the new Government, but little revenue for 
a series of years was expected from commerce. Th e public lands were 
considered as the principal resource of the country for the payment 
of the Revolutionary debt. Direct taxation was the means relied on to 
pay the current expenses of the Government. Th e short period that oc-
curred between the cession of western lands to the Federal Govern-
ment by Virginia and other States, and the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, was suffi  cient to show the necessity of a proper land system and a 
many of them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised, 
the rights of suff rage when the Constitution was adopted, and it was 
not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would greatly 
ameliorate their condition. 
Many of the States, on the adoption of the Constitution, or shortly 
afterward, took measures to abolish slavery within their respective ju-
risdictions; and it is a well-known fact that a belief was cherished by 
the leading men, South as well as North, that the institution of slavery 
would gradually decline, until it would become extinct. Th e increased 
value of slave labor, in the culture of cotton and sugar, prevented the 
realization of this expectation. Like all other communities and States, 
the South were infl uenced by what they considered to be their own 
interests. 
But if we are to turn our attention to the dark ages of the world, 
why confi ne our view to colored slavery? On the same principles, 
white men were made slaves. All slavery has its origin in power, and is 
against right. 
Th e power of Congress to establish Territorial Governments, and 
to prohibit the introduction of slavery therein, is the next point to be 
considered. 
After the cession of western territory by Virginia and other States, to 
the United States, the public attention was directed to the best mode of 
disposing of it for the general benefi t. While in attendance on the Fed-
eral Convention, Mr. Madison, in a letter to Edmund Randolph, dated 
the 22d April, 1787, says: “Congress are deliberating on the plan most 
eligible for disposing of the western territory not yet surveyed. Some al-
teration will probably be made in the ordinance on that subject.” And 
in the same letter he says: “Th e inhabitants of the Illinois complain of 
the land jobbers, &c., who are purchasing titles among them. Th ose of 
St. Vincent’s complain of the defective criminal and civil justice among 
them, as well as of military protection.” And on the next day he writes 
to Mr. Jeff erson: “Th e government of the settlements on the Illinois and 
Wabash is a subject very perplexing in itself, and rendered more so by 
our ignorance of the many circumstances on which a right judgment 
depends. Th e inhabitants at those places claim protection against the 
savages, and some provision for both civil and criminal justice.” 
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limited to the disposition of lands and other property belonging to the 
United States. Th at this is not the true construction of the section ap-
pears from the fact that in the fi rst line of the section “the power to 
dispose of the public lands” is given expressly, and, in addition, to make 
all needful rules and regulations. Th e power to dispose of is complete 
in itself, and requires nothing more. It authorizes Congress to use the 
proper means within its discretion, and any further provision for this 
purpose would be a useless verbiage. As a composition, the Constitu-
tion is remarkably free from such a charge. 
In the discussion of the power of Congress to govern a Territory, in 
the case of the Atlantic Insurance Company v. Canter, (1 Peters, 511; 
7 Curtis, 685,) Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said, in 
regard to the people of Florida, “they do not, however, participate in 
political power; they do not share in the Government till Florida shall 
become a State; in the mean time, Florida continues to be a Territory 
of the United States, governed by virtue of that clause in the Consti-
tution which empowers Congress “to make all needful rules and reg-
ulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States.” 
And he adds, “perhaps the power of governing a Territory belong-
ing to the United States, which has not, by becoming a State, acquired 
the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the fact that 
it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the 
power and jurisdiction of the United States. Th e right to govern may 
be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory; which-
ever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of 
it is unquestioned.” And in the close of the opinion, the court say, “in 
legislating for them [the Territories,] Congress exercises the combined 
powers of the General and State Governments.” 
Some consider the opinion to be loose and inconclusive; others, 
that it is obiter dicta; and the last sentence is objected to as recogniz-
ing absolute power in Congress over Territories. Th e learned and elo-
quent Wirt, who, in the argument of a cause before the court, had oc-
casion to cite a few sentences from an opinion of the Chief Justice, 
observed, “no one can mistake the style, the words so completely match 
the thought.” 
temporary Government. Th is was clearly seen by propositions and re-
marks in the Federal Convention, some of which are above cited, by 
the passage of the Ordinance of 1787, and the adoption of that instru-
ment by Congress, under the Constitution, which gave to it validity. 
It will be recollected that the deed of cession of western territory 
was made to the United States by Virginia in 1784, and that it required 
the territory ceded to be laid out into States, that the land should be 
disposed of for the common benefi t of the States, and that all right, ti-
tle, and claim, as well of soil as of jurisdiction, were ceded; and this was 
the form of cession from other States. 
On the 13th of July, the Ordinance of 1787 was passed, “for the 
government of the United States territory northwest of the river Ohio,” 
with but one dissenting vote. Th is instrument provided there should be 
organized in the territory not less than three nor more than fi ve States, 
designating their boundaries. It passed while the Federal Conven-
tion was in session, about two months before the Constitution was ad-
opted by the Convention. Th e members of the Convention must there-
fore have been well acquainted with the provisions of the Ordinance. It 
provided for a temporary Government, as initiatory to the formation 
of State Governments. Slavery was prohibited in the territory. 
Can any one suppose that the eminent men of the Federal Con-
vention could have overlooked or neglected a matter so vitally impor-
tant to the country, in the organization of temporary Governments for 
the vast territory northwest of the river Ohio? In the 3d section of the 
4th article of the Constitution, they did make provision for the ad-
mission of new States, the sale of the public lands, and the temporary 
Government of the territory. Without a temporary Government, new 
States could not have been formed, nor could the public lands have 
been sold. 
If the third section were before us now for consideration for the 
fi rst time, under the facts stated, I could not hesitate to say there was 
adequate legislative power given in it. Th e power to make all needful 
rules and regulations is a power to legislate. Th is no one will contro-
vert, as Congress cannot make “rules and regulations,” except by leg-
islation. But it is argued that the word territory is used as synonymous 
with the word land; and that the rules and regulations of Congress are 
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to the Government of the Union be an appropriate measure, not pro-
hibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of 
legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance.” 
Th e power to establish post offi  ces and post roads gives power to 
Congress to make contracts for the transportation of the mail, and 
to punish all who commit depredations upon it in its transit, or at its 
places of distribution. Congress has power to regulate commerce, and, 
in the exercise of its discretion, to lay an embargo, which suspends 
commerce; so, under the same power, harbors, lighthouses, breakwaters, 
&c., are constructed. 
Did Chief Justice Marshall, in saying that Congress governed a 
Territory, by exercising the combined powers of the Federal and State 
Governments, refer to unlimited discretion? A Government which can 
make white men slaves? Surely, such a remark in the argument must 
have been inadvertently uttered. On the contrary, there is no power in 
the Constitution by which Congress can make either white or black 
men slaves. In organizing the Government of a Territory, Congress is 
limited to means appropriate to the attainment of the constitutional 
object. No powers can be exercised which are prohibited by the Con-
stitution, or which are contrary to its spirit; so that, whether the ob-
ject may be the protection of the persons and property of purchasers 
of the public lands, or of communities who have been annexed to the 
Union by conquest or purchase, they are initiatory to the establishment 
of State Governments, and no more power can be claimed or exercised 
than is necessary to the attainment of the end. Th is is the limitation of 
all the Federal powers. 
But Congress has no power to regulate the internal concerns of a 
State, as of a Territory; consequently, in providing for the Government 
of a Territory, to some extent, the combined powers of the Federal and 
State Governments are necessarily exercised. If Congress should deem 
slaves or free colored persons injurious to the population of a free Ter-
ritory, as conducing to lessen the value of the public lands, or on any 
other ground connected with the public interest, they have the power 
to prohibit them from becoming settlers in it. Th is can be sustained 
on the ground of a sound national policy, which is so clearly shown in 
our history by practical results, that it would seem no considerate in-
I can see no want of precision in the language of the Chief Jus-
tice; his meaning cannot be mistaken. He states, fi rst, the third sec-
tion as giving power to Congress to govern the Territories, and two 
other grounds from which the power may also be implied. Th e ob-
jection seems to be, that the Chief Justice did not say which of the 
grounds stated he considered the source of the power. He did not spe-
cifi cally state this, but he did say, “whichever may be the source whence 
the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned.” No opinion 
of the court could have been expressed with a stronger emphasis; the 
power in Congress is unquestioned. But those who have undertaken to 
criticise the opinion, consider it without authority, because the Chief 
Justice did not designate specially the power. Th is is a singular objec-
tion. If the power be unquestioned, it can be a matter of no importance 
on which ground it is exercised. 
Th e opinion clearly was not obiter dicta. Th e turning point in the 
case was, whether Congress had power to authorize the Territorial 
Legislature of Florida to pass the law under which the Territorial court 
was established, whose decree was brought before this court for revi-
sion. Th e power of Congress, therefore, was the point in issue. 
Th e word “territory,” according to Worcester, “means land, country, a 
district of country under a temporary Government.” Th e words “terri-
tory or other property,” as used, do imply, from the use of the pronoun 
other, that territory was used as descriptive of land; but does it follow 
that it was not used also as descriptive of a district of country? In both 
of these senses it belonged to the United States—as land, for the pur-
pose of sale; as territory, for the purpose of government. But, if it be 
admitted that the word territory as used means land, and nothing but 
land, the power of Congress to organize a temporary Government is 
clear. It has power to make all needful regulations respecting the pub-
lic lands, and the extent of those “needful regulations” depends upon 
the direction of Congress, where the means are appropriate to the end, 
and do not confl ict with any of the prohibitions of the Constitution. If 
a temporary Government be deemed needful, necessary, requisite, or 
is wanted, Congress has power to establish it. Th is court says, in Mc-
Culloch v. Th e State of Maryland, (4 Wheat., 316,) “If a certain means to 
carry into eff ect any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution 
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And when there is a large district of country within the United 
States, and not within any State Government, if it be necessary to es-
tablish a temporary Government to carry out a power expressly vested 
in Congress-as the disposition of the public lands-may not such Gov-
ernment be instituted by Congress? How do we read the Constitution? 
Is it not a practical instrument? 
In such cases, no implication of a power can arise which is inhibited 
by the Constitution, or which may be against the theory of its con-
struction. As my opinion rests on the third section, these remarks are 
made as an intimation that the power to establish a temporary Gov-
ernment may arise, also, on the other two grounds stated in the opinion 
of the court in the insurance case, without weakening the third section. 
I would here simply remark, that the Constitution was formed for 
our whole country. An expansion or contraction of our territory required 
no change in the fundamental law. When we consider the men who laid 
the foundation of our Government and carried it into operation, the 
men who occupied the bench, who fi lled the halls of legislation and the 
Chief Magistracy, it would seem, if any question could be settled clear 
of all doubt, it was the power of Congress to establish Territorial Gov-
ernments. Slavery was prohibited in the entire Northwestern Territory, 
with the approbation of leading men, South and North; but this prohi-
bition was not retained when this ordinance was adopted for the gov-
ernment of Southern Territories, where slavery existed. In a late repub-
lication of a letter of Mr. Madison, dated November 27, 1819, speaking 
of this power of Congress to prohibit slavery in a Territory, he infers 
there is no such power, from the fact that it has not been exercised. Th is 
is not a very satisfactory argument against any power, as there are but 
few, if any, subjects on which the constitutional powers of Congress are 
exhausted. It is true, as Mr. Madison states, that Congress, in the act to 
establish a Government in the Mississippi Territory, prohibited the im-
portation of slaves into it from foreign parts; but it is equally true, that 
in the act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, Congress declared, “it 
shall not be lawful for any person to bring into Orleans Territory, from 
any port or place within the limits of the United States, any slave which 
shall have been imported since 1798, or which may hereafter be im-
ported, except by a citizen of the United States who settles in the Ter-
dividual can question it. And, as regards any unfairness of such a pol-
icy to our Southern brethren, as urged in the argument, it is only nec-
essary to say that, with one-fourth of the Federal population of the 
Union, they have in the slave States a larger extent of fertile territory 
than is included in the free States; and it is submitted, if masters of 
slaves be restricted from bringing them into free territory, that the re-
striction on the free citizens of non-slaveholding States, by bringing 
slaves into free territory, is four times greater than that complained of 
by the South. But, not only so; some three or four hundred thousand 
holders of slaves, by bringing them into free territory, impose a restric-
tion on twenty millions of the free States. Th e repugnancy to slavery 
would probably prevent fi fty or a hundred freemen from settling in a 
slave Territory, where one slaveholder would be prevented from settling 
in a free Territory. 
Th is remark is made in answer to the argument urged, that a prohi-
bition of slavery in the free Territories is inconsistent with the contin-
uance of the Union. Where a Territorial Government is established in 
a slave Territory, it has uniformly remained in that condition until the 
people form a State Constitution; the same course where the Territory 
is free, both parties acting in good faith, would be attended with satis-
factory results. 
Th e sovereignty of the Federal Government extends to the entire 
limits of our territory. Should any foreign power invade our jurisdic-
tion, it would be repelled. Th ere is a law of Congress to punish our citi-
zens for crimes committed in districts of country where there is no or-
ganized Government. Criminals are brought to certain Territories or 
States, designated in the law, for punishment. Death has been infl icted 
in Arkansas and in Missouri, on individuals, for murders committed 
beyond the limit of any organized Territory or State; and no one doubts 
that such a jurisdiction was rightfully exercised. If there be a right to 
acquire territory, there necessarily must be an implied power to govern 
it. When the military force of the Union shall conquer a country, may 
not Congress provide for the government of such country? Th is would 
be an implied power essential to the acquisition of new territory. Th is 
power has been exercised, without doubt of its constitutionality, over 
territory acquired by conquest and purchase. 
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the law-making power had united with the Judiciary, under the univer-
sal sanction of the whole country, to usurp a jurisdiction which did not 
belong to them. Such a discovery at this late date is more extraordinary 
than anything which has occurred in the judicial history of this or any 
other country. Texas, under a previous organization, was admitted as a 
State; but no State can be admitted into the Union which has not been 
organized under some form of government. Without temporary Gov-
ernments, our public lands could not have been sold, nor our wilder-
nesses reduced to cultivation, and the population protected; nor could 
our fl ourishing States, West and South, have been formed. 
What do the lessons of wisdom and experience teach, under such 
circumstances, if the new light, which has so suddenly and unexpect-
edly burst upon us, be true? Acquiescence; acquiescence under a settled 
construction of the Constitution for sixty years, though it may be erro-
neous; which has secured to the country an advancement and prosper-
ity beyond the power of computation. 
An act of James Madison, when President, forcibly illustrates this 
policy. He had made up his opinion that Congress had no power un-
der the Constitution to establish a National Bank. In 1815, Congress 
passed a bill to establish a bank. He vetoed the bill, on objections other 
than constitutional. In his message, he speaks as a wise statesman and 
Chief Magistrate, as follows: 
“Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of 
the Legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as be-
ing precluded, in my judgment, by the repeated recogni-
tions under varied circumstances of the validity of such 
an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by 
indications, in diff erent modes, of a concurrence of the 
general will of the nation.”
Has this impressive lesson of practical wisdom become lost to the 
present generation? 
If the great and fundamental principles of our Government are 
never to be settled, there can be no lasting prosperity. Th e Constitution 
will become a fl oating waif on the billows of popular excitement. 
ritory, under the penalty of the freedom of such slave.” Th e inference of 
Mr. Madison, therefore, against the power of Congress, is of no force, as 
it was founded on a fact supposed, which did not exist. 
It is refreshing to turn to the early incidents of our history, and 
learn wisdom from the acts of the great men who have gone to their 
account. I refer to a report in the House of Representatives, by John 
Randolph, of Roanoke, as chairman of a committee, in March, 1803—
fi fty-four years ago. From the Convention held at Vincennes, in Indi-
ana, by their President, and from the people of the Territory, a petition 
was presented to Congress, praying the suspension of the provision 
which prohibited slavery in that Territory. Th e report stated “that the 
rapid population of the State of Ohio suffi  ciently evinces, in the opin-
ion of your committee, that the labor of slaves is not necessary to pro-
mote the growth and settlement of colonies in that region. Th at this 
labor, demonstrably the dearest of any, can only be employed to advan-
tage in the cultivation of products more valuable than any known to 
that quarter of the United States; that the committee deem it highly 
dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to 
promote the happiness and prosperity of the Northwestern country, 
and to give strength and security to that extensive frontier. In the salu-
tary operation of this sagacious and benevolent restraint, it is believed 
that the inhabitants will, at no very distant day, fi nd ample remunera-
tion for a temporary privation of labor and of emigration.” (1 vol. State 
Papers, Public Lands, 160.) 
Th e judicial mind of this country, State and Federal, has agreed on 
no subject, within its legitimate action, with equal unanimity, as on the 
power of Congress to establish Territorial Governments. No court, State 
or Federal, no judge or statesman, is known to have had any doubts on 
this question for nearly sixty years after the power was exercised. Such 
Governments have been established from the sources of the Ohio to 
the Gulf of Mexico, extending to the Lakes on the north and the Pa-
cifi c Ocean on the west, and from the lines of Georgia to Texas. 
Great interests have grown up under the Territorial laws over a 
country more than fi ve times greater in extent than the original thir-
teen States; and these interests, corporate or otherwise, have been cher-
ished and consolidated by a benign policy, without any one supposing 
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public purposes. It only prohibited slavery; in doing which, it followed 
the ordinance of 1787. 
I will now consider the fourth head, which is: “Th e eff ect of taking 
slaves into a State or Territory, and so holding them, where slavery is 
prohibited.” 
If the principle laid down in the case of Prigg v. Th e State of Penn-
sylvania is to be maintained, and it is certainly to be maintained un-
til overruled, as the law of this court, there can be no diffi  culty on this 
point. In that case, the court says: “Th e state of slavery is deemed to be 
a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range 
of the territorial laws.” If this be so, slavery can exist nowhere except 
under the authority of law, founded on usage having the force of law, 
or by statutory recognition. And the court further says: “It is manifest, 
from this consideration, that if the Constitution had not contained the 
clause requiring the rendition of fugitives from labor, every non- slave-
holding State in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared 
free all runaway slaves coming within its limits, and to have given them 
entire immunity and protection against the claims of their masters.” 
Now, if a slave abscond, he may be reclaimed; but if he accompany 
his master into a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited, such 
slave cannot be said to have left the service of his master where his ser-
vices were legalized. And if slavery be limited to the range of the ter-
ritorial laws, how can the slave be coerced to serve in a State or Ter-
ritory, not only without the authority of law, but against its express 
provisions? What gives the master the right to control the will of his 
slave? Th e local law, which exists in some form. But where there is no 
such law, can the master control the will of the slave by force? Where 
no slavery exists, the presumption, without regard to color, is in favor of 
freedom. Under such a jurisdiction, may the colored man be levied on 
as the property of his master by a creditor? On the decease of the mas-
ter, does the slave descend to his heirs as property? Can the master sell 
him? Any one or all of these acts may be done to the slave, where he is 
legally held to service. But where the law does not confer this power, it 
cannot be exercised. 
Lord Mansfi eld held that a slave brought into England was free. 
Lord Stowell agreed with Lord Mansfi eld in this respect, and that the 
Th e prohibition of slavery north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, 
and of the State of Missouri, contained in the act admitting that State 
into the Union, was passed by a vote of 134, in the House of Repre-
sentatives, to 42. Before Mr. Monroe signed the act, it was submitted 
by him to his Cabinet, and they held the restriction of slavery in a Ter-
ritory to be within the constitutional powers of Congress. It would be 
singular, if in 1804 Congress had power to prohibit the introduction 
of slaves in Orleans Territory from any other part of the Union, under 
the penalty of freedom to the slave, if the same power, embodied in the 
Missouri compromise, could not be exercised in 1820. 
But this law of Congress, which prohibits slavery north of Mis-
souri and of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, is declared to have been 
null and void by my brethren. And this opinion is founded mainly, as 
I understand, on the distinction drawn between the ordinance of 1787 
and the Missouri compromise line. In what does the distinction con-
sist? Th e ordinance, it is said, was a compact entered into by the con-
federated States before the adoption of the Constitution; and that in 
the cession of territory authority was given to establish a Territorial 
Government. 
It is clear that the ordinance did not go into operation by virtue of 
the authority of the Confederation, but by reason of its modifi cation 
and adoption by Congress under the Constitution. It seems to be sup-
posed, in the opinion of the court, that the articles of cession placed it 
on a diff erent footing from territories subsequently acquired. I am un-
able to perceive the force of this distinction. Th at the ordinance was 
intended for the government of the Northwestern Territory, and was 
limited to such Territory, is admitted. It was extended to Southern Ter-
ritories, with modifi cations, by acts of Congress, and to some Northern 
Territories. But the ordinance was made valid by the act of Congress, 
and without such act could have been of no force. It rested for its va-
lidity on the act of Congress, the same, in my opinion, as the Missouri 
compromise line. 
If Congress may establish a Territorial Government in the exercise 
of its discretion, it is a clear principle that a court cannot control that 
discretion. Th is being the case, I do not see on what ground the act 
is held to be void. It did not purport to forfeit property, or take it for 
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in regard to the extent of slavery. Until it shall be overturned, it is not a 
point for argument; it is obligatory on myself and my brethren, and on 
all judicial tribunals over which this court exercises an appellate power. 
It is said the Territories are common property of the States, and that 
every man has a right to go there with his property. Th is is not contro-
verted. But the court say a slave is not property beyond the operation 
of the local law which makes him such. Never was a truth more au-
thoritatively and justly uttered by man. Suppose a master of a slave in a 
British island owned a million of property in England; would that au-
thorize him to take his slaves with him to England? Th e Constitution, 
in express terms, recognizes the status of slavery as founded on the mu-
nicipal law: “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the 
laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,” &c. Now, unless the fugitive 
escape from a place where, by the municipal law, he is held to labor, 
this provision aff ords no remedy to the master. What can be more con-
clusive than this? Suppose a slave escape from a Territory where slav-
ery is not authorized by law, can he be reclaimed? 
In this case, a majority of the court have said that a slave may be 
taken by his master into a Territory of the United States, the same as 
a horse, or any other kind of property. It is true, this was said by the 
court, as also many other things, which are of no authority. Nothing 
that has been said by them, which has not a direct bearing on the ju-
risdiction of the court, against which they decided, can be considered 
as authority. I shall certainly not regard it as such. Th e question of ju-
risdiction, being before the court, was decided by them authoritatively, 
but nothing beyond that question. A slave is not a mere chattel. He 
bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God 
and man; and he is destined to an endless existence. 
Under this head I shall chiefl y rely on the decisions of the Supreme 
Courts of the Southern States, and especially of the State of Missouri. 
In the fi rst and second sections of the sixth article of the Constitu-
tion of Illinois, it is declared that neither slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude shall hereafter be introduced into this State, otherwise than for 
the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed; and in the second section it is declared that any violation of this 
article shall eff ect the emancipation of such person from his obligation 
slave could not be coerced in England; but on her voluntary return to 
Antigua, the place of her slave domicile, her former status attached. 
Th e law of England did not prohibit slavery, but did not authorize it. 
Th e jurisdiction which prohibits slavery is much stronger in behalf of 
the slave within it, than where it only does not authorize it. 
By virtue of what law is it, that a master may take his slave into free 
territory, and exact from him the duties of a slave? Th e law of the Terri-
tory does not sanction it. No authority can be claimed under the Con-
stitution of the United States, or any law of Congress. Will it be said 
that the slave is taken as property, the same as other property which the 
master may own? To this I answer, that colored persons are made prop-
erty by the law of the State, and no such power has been given to Con-
gress. Does the master carry with him the law of the State from which 
he removes into the Territory? and does that enable him to coerce his 
slave in the Territory? Let us test this theory. If this may be done by 
a master from one slave State, it may be done by a master from every 
other slave State. Th is right is supposed to be connected with the per-
son of the master, by virtue of the local law. Is it transferable? May it be 
negotiated, as a promissory note or bill of exchange? If it be assigned to 
a man from a free State, may he coerce the slave by virtue of it? What 
shall this thing be denominated? Is it personal or real property? Or is it 
an indefi nable fragment of sovereignty, which every person carries with 
him from his late domicile? One thing is certain, that its origin has been 
very recent, and it is unknown to the laws of any civilized country. 
A slave is brought to England from one of its islands, where slavery 
was introduced and maintained by the mother country. Although there 
is no law prohibiting slavery in England, yet there is no law authorizing 
it; and, for near a century, its courts have declared that the slave there 
is free from the coercion of the master. Lords Mansfi eld and Stowell 
agree upon this point, and there is no dissenting authority. 
Th ere is no other description of property which was not protected 
in England, brought from one of its slave islands. Does not this show 
that property in a human being does not arise from nature or from the 
common law, but, in the language of this court, “it is a mere munici-
pal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial 
laws?” Th is decision is not a mere argument, but it is the end of the law, 
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Th at any sort of residence contrived or permitted by the legal owner 
of the slave, upon the faith of secret trusts or contracts, in order to de-
feat or evade the ordinance, and thereby introduce slavery de facto, 
would entitle such slave to freedom. 
In Julia v. McKinney, (3 Missouri Rep., 279,) it was held, where a 
slave was settled in the State of Illinois, but with an intention on the 
part of the owner to be removed at some future day, that hiring said 
slave to a person to labor for one or two days, and receiving the pay for 
the hire, the slave is entitled to her freedom, under the second section 
of the sixth article of the Constitution of Illinois. 
Rachel v. Walker (4 Missouri Rep., 350, June term, 1836) is a case 
involving, in every particular, the principles of the case before us. Ra-
chel sued for her freedom; and it appeared that she had been bought as 
a slave in Missouri, by Stockton, an offi  cer of the army, taken to Fort 
Snelling, where he was stationed, and she was retained there as a slave 
a year; and then Stockton removed to Prairie du Chien, taking Rachel 
with him as a slave, where he continued to hold her three years, and 
then he took her to the State of Missouri, and sold her as a slave. 
“Fort Snelling was admitted to be on the west side of the 
Mississippi river, and north of the State of Missouri, in 
the territory of the United States. Th at Prairie du Chien 
was in the Michigan Territory, on the east side of the 
Mississippi river. Walker, the defendant, held Rachel un-
der Stockton.”
Th e court said, in this case: 
“Th e offi  cer lived in Missouri Territory, at the time he 
bought the slave; he sent to a slaveholding country and 
procured her; this was his voluntary act, done without 
any other reason than that of his convenience; and he 
and those claiming under him must be holden to abide 
the consequences of introducing slavery both in Missouri 
Territory and Michigan, contrary to law; and on that 
ground Rachel was declared to be entitled to freedom.” 
In answer to the argument that, as an offi  cer of the army, 
the master had a right to take his slave into free terri-
to service. In Illinois, a right of transit through the State is given the 
master with his slaves. Th is is a matter which, as I suppose, belongs ex-
clusively to the State. 
Th e Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Jarrot v. Jarrot, (2 
Gilmer, 7,) said: 
“After the conquest of this Territory by Virginia, she 
ceded it to the United States, and stipulated that the ti-
tles and possessions, rights and liberties, of the French 
settlers, should be guarantied to them. Th is, it has been 
contended, secured them in the possession of those ne-
groes as slaves which they held before that time, and that 
neither Congress nor the Convention had power to de-
prive them of it; or, in other words, that the ordinance 
and Constitution should not be so interpreted and un-
derstood as applying to such slaves, when it is therein de-
clared that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude in the Northwest Territory, nor in the State of 
Illinois, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes. But 
it was held that those rights could not be thus protected, 
but must yield to the ordinance and Constitution.”
Th e fi rst slave case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, con-
tained in the reports, was Winny v. Whitesides, (1 Missouri Rep., 473,) 
at October term, 1824. It appeared that, more than twenty-fi ve years 
before, the defendant, with her husband, had removed from Carolina 
to Illinois, and brought with them the plaintiff ; that they continued to 
reside in Illinois three or four years, retaining the plaintiff  as a slave; af-
ter which, they removed to Missouri, taking her with them. 
Th e court held, that if a slave be detained in Illinois until he be en-
titled to freedom, the right of the owner does not revive when he fi nds 
the negro in a slave State. Th at when a slave is taken to Illinois by his 
owner, who takes up his residence there, the slave is entitled to freedom. 
In the case of Lagrange v. Chouteau, (2 Missouri Rep., 20, at May 
term, 1828,) it was decided that the ordinance of 1787 was intended 
as a fundamental law for those who may choose to live under it, rather 
than as a penal statute. 
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voluntarily taken his slave to a place where the relation of 
master and slave did not exist. But subsequent cases base 
the right to ‘exact the forfeiture of emancipation,’ as they 
term it, on the ground, it would seem, that it was the duty 
of the courts of this State to carry into eff ect the Consti-
tution and laws of other States and Territories, regardless 
of the rights, the policy, or the institutions, of the people 
of this State.”
And the court say that the States of the Union, in their munici-
pal concerns, are regarded as foreign to each other; that the courts of 
one State do not take notice of the laws of other States, unless proved 
as facts, and that every State has the right to determine how far its 
comity to other States shall extend; and it is laid down, that when 
there is no act of manumission decreed to the free State, the courts 
of the slave States cannot be called to give eff ect to the law of the free 
State. Comity, it alleges, between States, depends upon the discretion 
of both, which may be varied by circumstances. And it is declared by 
the court, “that times are not as they were when the former decisions 
on this subject were made.” Since then, not only individuals but States 
have been possession with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, 
whose gratifi cation is sought in the pursuit of measures whose inevi-
table consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our Gov-
ernment. Under such circumstances, it does not behoove the State of 
Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might 
gratify this spirit. She is willing to assume her full responsibility for 
the existence of slavery within her limits, nor does she seek to share or 
divide it with others. 
Chief Justice Gamble dissented from the other two judges. He 
says: 
“In every slaveholding State in the Union, the subject of 
emancipation is regulated by statute; and the forms are 
prescribed in which it shall be eff ected. Whenever the 
forms required by the laws of the State in which the mas-
ter and slave are resident are complied with, the eman-
cipation is complete, and the slave is free. If the right of 
tory, the court said no authority of law or the Govern-
ment compelled him to keep the plaintiff  there as a slave. 
“Shall it be said, that because an offi  cer of the army owns 
slaves in Virginia, that when, as offi  cer and soldier, he is 
required to take the command of a fort in the non-slave-
holding States or Territories, he thereby has a right to 
take with him as many slaves as will suit his interests or 
convenience? It surely cannot be law. If this be true, the 
court say, then it is also true that the convenience or sup-
posed convenience of the offi  cer repeals, as to him and 
others who have the same character, the ordinance and 
the act of 1821, admitting Missouri into the Union, and 
also the prohibition of the several laws and Constitutions 
of the non-slaveholding States.”
In Wilson v. Melvin, (4 Missouri R., 592,) it appeared the defen-
dant left Tennessee with an intention of residing in Illinois, taking 
his negroes with him. After a month’s stay in Illinois, he took his ne-
groes to St. Louis, and hired them, then returned to Illinois. On these 
facts, the inferior court instructed the jury that the defendant was a 
sojourner in Illinois. Th is the Supreme Court held was error, and the 
judgment was reversed. 
Th e case of Dred Scott v. Emerson (15 Missouri R., 682, March term, 
1852) will now be stated. Th is case involved the identical question be-
fore us, Emerson having, since the hearing, sold the plaintiff  to Sand-
ford, the defendant. 
Two of the judges ruled the case, the Chief Justice dissenting. It 
cannot be improper to state the grounds of the opinion of the court, 
and of the dissent. Th e court say: 
“Cases of this kind are not strangers in our court. Persons 
have been frequently here adjudged to be entitled to their 
freedom, on the ground that their masters held them in 
slavery in Territories or States in which that institution 
is prohibited. From the fi rst case decided in our court, it 
might be inferred that this result was brought about by 
a presumed assent of the master, from the fact of having 
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that the master, by making the free State the residence of 
his slave, has submitted his right to the operation of the 
law of such State; and this,” he says, “is the same in law as 
a regular deed of emancipation.”
He adds: 
I regard the question as conclusively settled by repeated 
adjudications of this court, and, if I doubted or denied 
the propriety of those decisions, I would not feel myself 
any more at liberty to overturn them, than I would any 
other series of decisions by which the law of any other 
question was settled. Th ere is with me,” he says, “nothing 
in the law relating to slavery which distinguishes it from 
the law on any other subject, or allows any more accom-
modation to the temporary public excitements which are 
gathered around it.” 
“In this State,” he says, “it has been recognized from 
the beginning of the Government as a correct position in 
law, that a master who takes his slave to reside in a State 
or Territory where slavery is prohibited, thereby emanci-
pates his slave.” Th ese decisions, which come down to the 
year 1837, seemed to have so fully settled the question, 
that since that time there has been no case bringing it 
before the court for any reconsideration, until the pres-
ent. In the case of Winny v. Whitesides, the question was 
made in the argument, “whether one nation would exe-
cute the penal laws of another,” and the court replied in 
this language, (Huberus, quoted in 4 Dallas,) which says, 
“personal rights or disabilities obtained or communicated 
by the laws of any particular place are of a nature which 
accompany the person wherever he goes;” and the Chief 
Justice observed, in the case of Rachel v. Walker, the act 
of Congress called the Missouri compromise was held as 
operative as the ordinance of 1787.
When Dred Scott, his wife and children, were removed from Fort 
Snelling to Missouri, in 1838, they were free, as the law was then set-
the person thus emancipated is subsequently drawn in 
question in another State, it will be ascertained and de-
termined by the law of the State in which the slave and 
his former master resided; and when it appears that such 
law has been complied with, the right to freedom will be 
fully sustained in the courts of all the slaveholding States, 
although the act of emancipation may not be in the form 
required by law in which the court sits.
“In all such cases, courts continually administer the 
law of the country where the right was acquired; and 
when that law becomes known to the court, it is just as 
much a matter of course to decide the rights of the par-
ties according to its requirements, as it is to settle the title 
of real estate situated in our State by its own laws.”
Th is appears to me a most satisfactory answer to the argument of 
the court. Chief Justice continues: 
“Th e perfect equality of the diff erent States lies at the 
foundation of the Union. As the institution of slavery 
in the States is one over which the Constitution of the 
United States gives no power to the General Govern-
ment, it is left to be adopted or rejected by the several 
States, as they think best; nor can any one State, or num-
ber of States, claim the right to interfere with any other 
State upon the question of admitting or excluding this 
institution.
“A citizen of Missouri, who removes with his slave to 
Illinois, has no right to complain that the fundamental 
law of that State to which he removes, and in which he 
makes his residence, dissolves the relation between him 
and his slave. It is as much his own voluntary act, as if he 
had executed a deed of emancipation. No one can pre-
tend ignorance of this constitutional provision, and,” he 
says, “the decisions which have heretofore been made in 
this State, and in many other slaveholding States, give ef-
fect to this and other similar provisions, on the ground 
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not regard either of those laws, without which there was no case be-
fore it; and Dred Scott, having been a slave, remains a slave. In this re-
spect it is admitted this is a Missouri question—a case which has but 
one side, if the act of Congress and the Constitution of Illinois are not 
recognized. 
And does such a case constitute a rule of decision for this court-
a case to be followed by this court? Th e course of decision so long and 
so uniformly maintained established a comity or law between Missouri 
and the free States and Territories where slavery was prohibited, which 
must be somewhat regarded in this case. Rights sanctioned for twenty-
eight years ought not and cannot be repudiated, with any semblance of 
justice, by one or two decisions, infl uenced, as declared, by a determi-
nation to counteract the excitement against slavery in the free States. 
Th e courts of Louisiana having held, for a series of years, that where 
a master took his slave to France, or any free State, he was entitled to 
freedom, and that on bringing him back the status of slavery did not 
attach, the Legislature of Louisiana declared by an act that the slave 
should not be made free under such circumstances. Th is regulated the 
rights of the master from the time the act took eff ect. But the deci-
sion of the Missouri court, reversing a former decision, aff ects all previ-
ous decisions, technically, made on the same principles, unless such de-
cisions are protected by the lapse of time or the statute of limitations. 
Dred Scott and his family, beyond all controversy, were free under the 
decisions made for twenty-eight years, before the case of Scott v. Em-
erson. Th is was the undoubted law of Missouri for fourteen years af-
ter Scott and his family were brought back to that State. And the grave 
question arises, whether this law may be so disregarded as to enslave 
free persons. I am strongly inclined to think that a rule of decision so 
well settled as not to be questioned, cannot be annulled by a single de-
cision of the court. Such rights may be inoperative under the decision 
in future; but I cannot well perceive how it can have the same eff ect in 
prior cases. 
It is admitted, that when a former decision is reversed, the tech-
nical eff ect of the judgment is to make all previous adjudications on 
the same question erroneous. But the case before us was not that the 
law had been erroneously construed, but that, under the circumstances 
tled, and continued for fourteen years afterwards, up to 1852, when the 
above decision was made. Prior to this, for nearly thirty years, as Chief 
Justice Gamble declares, the residence of a master with his slave in the 
State of Illinois, or in the Territory north of Missouri, where slavery 
was prohibited by the act called the Missouri compromise, would man-
umit the slave as eff ectually as if he had executed a deed of emancipa-
tion; and that an offi  cer of the army who takes his slave into that State 
or Territory, and holds him there as a slave, liberates him the same as 
any other citizen- and down to the above time it was settled by numer-
ous and uniform decisions, and that on the return of the slave to Mis-
souri, his former condition of slavery did not attach. Such was the set-
tled law of Missouri until the decision of Scott and Emerson. 
In the case of Sylvia v. Kirby, (17 Misso. Rep., 434,) the court fol-
lowed the above decision, observing it was similar in all respects to the 
case of Scott and Emerson. 
Th is court follows the established construction of the statutes of a 
State by its Supreme Court. Such a construction is considered as a part 
of the statute, and we follow it to avoid two rules of property in the 
same State. But we do not follow the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of a State beyond a statutory construction as a rule of decision for this 
court. State decisions are always viewed with respect and treated as au-
thority; but we follow the settled construction of the statutes, not be-
cause it is of binding authority, but in pursuance of a rule of judicial 
policy. 
But there is no pretence that the case of Dred Scott v. Emerson 
turned upon the construction of a Missouri statute; nor was there any 
established rule of property which could have rightfully infl uenced the 
decision. On the contrary, the decision overruled the settled law for 
near thirty years. 
Th is is said by my brethren to be a Missouri question; but there is 
nothing which gives it this character, except that it involves the right to 
persons claimed as slaves who reside in Missouri, and the decision was 
made by the Supreme Court of that State. It involves a right claimed 
under an act of Congress and the Constitution of Illinois, and which 
cannot be decided without the consideration and construction of those 
laws. But the Supreme Court of Missouri held, in this case, that it will 
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Th e answer to this is, in the fi rst place, that such a subject does not 
belong to the treaty-making power; and any such arrangement would 
have been nugatory. And, in the second place, by no admissible con-
struction can the guaranty be carried further than the protection of 
property in slaves at that time in the ceded territory. And this has been 
complied with. Th e organization of the slave States of Louisiana, Mis-
souri, and Arkansas, embraced every slave in Louisiana at the time of 
the cession. Th is removes every ground of objection under the treaty. 
Th ere is therefore no pretence, growing out of the treaty, that any part 
of the territory of Louisiana, as ceded, beyond the organized States, is 
slave territory. 
Under the fi fth head, we were to consider whether the status of 
slavery attached to the plaintiff  and wife, on their return to Missouri. 
Th is doctrine is not asserted in the late opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri, and up to 1852 the contrary doctrine was uniformly 
maintained by that court. 
In its late decision, the court say that it will not give eff ect in Mis-
souri to the laws of Illinois, or the law of Congress called the Missouri 
compromise. Th is was the eff ect of the decision, though its terms were, 
that the court would not take notice, judicially, of those laws. 
In 1851, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina recognized the 
principle, that a slave, being taken to a free State, became free. ( Com-
monwealth v. Pleasants, 10 Leigh Rep., 697.) In Betty v. Horton, the 
Court of Appeals held that the freedom of the slave was acquired by 
the action of the laws of Massachusetts, by the said slave being taken 
there. ( 5 Leigh Rep., 615.) 
Th e slave States have generally adopted the rule, that where the 
master, by a residence with his slave in a State or Territory where slav-
ery is prohibited, the slave was entitled to his freedom everywhere. Th is 
was the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court of Missouri. It has been 
so held in Mississippi, in Virginia, in Louisiana, formerly in Kentucky, 
Maryland, and in other States. 
Th e law, where a contract is made and is to be executed, governs it. 
Th is does not depend upon comity, but upon the law of the contract. 
And if, in the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri, the mas-
ter, by taking his slave to Illinois, and employing him there as a slave, 
which then existed, that law would not be recognized; and the reason 
for this is declared to be the excitement against the institution of slav-
ery in the free States. While I lament this excitement as much as any 
one, I cannot assent that it shall be made a basis of judicial action. 
In 1816, the common law, by statute, was made a part of the law of 
Missouri; and that includes the great principles of international law. 
Th ese principles cannot be abrogated by judicial decisions. It will re-
quire the same exercise of power to abolish the common law, as to in-
troduce it. International law is founded in the opinions generally 
received and acted on by civilized nations, and enforced by moral sanc-
tions. It becomes a more authoritative system when it results from spe-
cial compacts, founded on modifi ed rules, adapted to the exigencies of 
human society; it is in fact an international morality, adapted to the 
best interests of nations. And in regard to the States of this Union, on 
the subject of slavery, it is eminently fi tted for a rule of action, subject 
to the Federal Constitution. “Th e laws of nations are but the natural 
rights of man applied to nations.” (Vattel.) 
If the common law have the force of a statutory enactment in Mis-
souri, it is clear, as it seems to me, that a slave who, by a residence in Il-
linois in the service of his master, becomes entitled to his freedom, can-
not again be reduced to slavery by returning to his former domicile in a 
slave State. It is unnecessary to say what legislative power might do by 
a general act in such a case, but it would be singular if a freeman could 
be made a slave by the exercise of a judicial discretion. And it would be 
still more extraordinary if this could be done, not only in the absence 
of special legislation, but in a State where the common law is in force. 
It is supposed by some, that the third article in the treaty of cession 
of Louisiana to this country, by France, in 1803, may have some bear-
ing on this question. Th e article referred to provides, “that the inhab-
itants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union, and 
enjoy all the advantages of citizens of the United States, and in the 
mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoy-
ment of their liberty, property, and the religion they profess.” 
As slavery existed in Louisiana at the time of the cession, it 
is supposed this is a guaranty that there should be no change in its 
condition. 
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were then removed to the State of Missouri, and sold as slaves, and in 
the action before us they are not only claimed as slaves, but a majority 
of my brethren have held that on their being returned to Missouri the 
status of slavery attached to them. 
I am not able to reconcile this result with the respect due to the 
State of Illinois. Having the same rights of sovereignty as the State 
of Missouri in adopting a Constitution, I can perceive no reason why 
the institutions of Illinois should not receive the same consideration 
as those of Missouri. Allowing to my brethren the same right of judg-
ment that I exercise myself, I must be permitted to say that it seems to 
me the principle laid down will enable the people of a slave State to in-
troduce slavery into a free State, for a longer or shorter time, as may 
suit their convenience; and by returning the slave to the State whence 
he was brought, by force or otherwise, the status of slavery attaches, 
and protects the rights of the master, and defi es the sovereignty of the 
free State. Th ere is no evidence before us that Dred Scott and his fam-
ily returned to Missouri voluntarily. Th e contrary is inferable from the 
agreed case: “In the year 1838, Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff  and 
said Harriet, and their daughter Eliza, from Fort Snelling to the State 
of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.” Th is is the agreed case; 
and can it be inferred from this that Scott and family returned to Mis-
souri voluntarily? He was removed; which shows that he was passive, 
as a slave, having exercised no volition on the subject. He did not resist 
the master by absconding or force. But that was not suffi  cient to bring 
him within Lord Stowell’s decision; he must have acted voluntarily. It 
would be a mockery of law and an outrage on his rights to coerce his 
return, and then claim that it was voluntary, and on that ground that 
his former status of slavery attached. 
If the decision be placed on this ground, it is a fact for a jury to de-
cide, whether the return was voluntary, or else the fact should be dis-
tinctly admitted. A presumption against the plaintiff  in this respect, I 
say with confi dence, is not authorized from the facts admitted. 
In coming to the conclusion that a voluntary return by Grace to 
her former domicile, slavery attached, Lord Stowell took great pains 
to show that England forced slavery upon her colonies, and that it was 
maintained by numerous acts of Parliament and public policy, and, in 
emancipates him as eff ectually as by a deed of emancipation, is it pos-
sible that such an act is not matter for adjudication in any slave State 
where the master may take him? Does not the master assent to the law, 
when he places himself under it in a free State? 
Th e States of Missouri and Illinois are bounded by a common line. 
Th e one prohibits slavery, the other admits it. Th is has been done by 
the exercise of that sovereign power which appertains to each. We are 
bound to respect the institutions of each, as emanating from the volun-
tary action of the people. Have the people of either any right to disturb 
the relations of the other? Each State rests upon the basis of its own 
sovereignty, protected by the Constitution. Our Union has been the 
foundation of our prosperity and national glory. Shall we not cherish 
and maintain it? Th is can only be done by respecting the legal rights of 
each State. 
If a citizen of a free State shall entice or enable a slave to escape 
from the service of his master, the law holds him responsible, not only 
for the loss of the slave, but he is liable to be indicted and fi ned for the 
misdemeanor. And I am bound here to say, that I have never found a 
jury in the four States which constitute my circuit, which have not sus-
tained this law, where the evidence required them to sustain it. And it is 
proper that I should also say, that more cases have arisen in my circuit, 
by reason of its extent and locality, than in all other parts of the Union. 
Th is has been done to vindicate the sovereign rights of the Southern 
States, and protect the legal interests of our brethren of the South. 
Let these facts be contrasted with the case now before the court. Il-
linois has declared in the most solemn and impressive form that there 
shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in that State, and that 
any slave brought into it, with a view of becoming a resident, shall be 
emancipated. And eff ect has been given to this provision of the Con-
stitution by the decision of the Supreme Court of that State. With a 
full knowledge of these facts, a slave is brought from Missouri to Rock 
Island, in the State of Illinois, and is retained there as a slave for two 
years, and then taken to Fort Snelling, where slavery is prohibited by 
the Missouri compromise act, and there he is detained two years lon-
ger in a state of slavery. Harriet, his wife, was also kept at the same 
place four years as a slave, having been purchased in Missouri. Th ey 
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years, the statute in force all the time; then he brings him 
as a slave to Virginia, and sells him there. Adjudged, in 
an action brought by the man against the purchaser, that 
he is free.”
Judge Kerr, in the case, says: 
“Agreeing, as I do, with the general view taken in this 
case by my brother Green, I would not add a word, but 
to mark the exact extent to which I mean to go. Th e law 
of Maryland having enacted that slaves carried into that 
State for sale or to reside shall be free, and the owner of 
the slave here having carried him to Maryland, and vol-
untarily submitting himself and the slave to that law, it 
governs the case.”
In every decision of a slave case prior to that of Dred Scott v. Emer-
son, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered it as turning upon the 
Constitution of Illinois, the ordinance of 1787, or the Missouri com-
promise act of 1820. Th e court treated these acts as in force, and held 
itself bound to execute them, by declaring the slave to be free who had 
acquired a domicile under them with the consent of his master. 
Th e late decision reversed this whole line of adjudication, and held 
that neither the Constitution and laws of the States, nor acts of Con-
gress in relation to Territories, could be judicially noticed by the Su-
preme Court of Missouri. Th is is believed to be in confl ict with the de-
cisions of all the courts in the Southern States, with some exceptions of 
recent cases. 
In Marie Louise v. Morat et al., (9 Louisiana Rep., 475,) it was held, 
where a slave having been taken to the kingdom of France or other 
country by the owner, where slavery is not tolerated, operates on the 
condition of the slave, and produces immediate emancipation; and that, 
where a slave thus becomes free, the master cannot reduce him again to 
slavery. Josephine v. Poultney, (Louisiana Annual Rep., 329,) “where the 
owner removes with a slave into a State in which slavery is prohibited, 
with the intention of residing there, the slave will be thereby emanci-
pated, and their subsequent return to the State of Louisiana cannot re-
store the relation of master and slave.” To the same import are the cases 
short, that the system of slavery was not only established by Great Brit-
ain in her West Indian colonies, but that it was popular and profi table 
to many of the wealthy and infl uential people of England, who were 
engaged in trade, or owned and cultivated plantations in the colonies. 
No one can read his elaborate views, and not be struck with the great 
diff erence between England and her colonies, and the free and slave 
States of this Union. While slavery in the colonies of England is sub-
ject to the power of the mother country, our States, especially in regard 
to slavery, are independent, resting upon their own sovereignties, and 
subject only to international laws, which apply to independent States. 
In the case of Williams, who was a slave in Granada, having run 
away, came to England, Lord Stowell said: “Th e four judges all concur 
in this—that he was a slave in Granada, though a free man in England, 
and he would have continued a free man in all other parts of the world 
except Granada.” 
Strader v. Graham (10 Howard, 82, and 18 Curtis, 305) has been 
cited as having a direct bearing in the case before us. In that case the 
court say: “It was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine, 
for itself, whether the employment of slaves in another State should 
or should not make them free on their return.” No question was be-
fore the court in that case, except that of jurisdiction. And any opin-
ion given on any other point is obiter dictum, and of no authority. In 
the conclusion of his opinion, the Chief Justice said: “In every view of 
the subject, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the 
writ of error must on that ground be dismissed.” 
In the case of Spencer v. Negro Dennis, (8 Gill’s Rep., 321,) the court 
say: “Once free, and always free, is the maxim of Maryland law upon 
the subject. Freedom having once vested, by no compact between the 
master and the liberated slave, nor by any condition subsequent, at-
tached by the master to the gift of freedom, can a state of slavery be 
reproduced.” 
In Hunter v. Bulcher, (1 Leigh, 172): 
“By a statute of Maryland of 1796, all slaves brought into 
that State to reside are declared free; a Virginian-born 
slave is carried by his master to Maryland; the master set-
tled there, and keeps the slave there in bondage for twelve 
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the right of the master on one side, based upon the force 
of written law, must be equally conclusive in favor of the 
slave, when he can point out in the statute the clause 
which secures his freedom.”
And he further said: 
“Free people of color in all the States are, it is believed, 
quasi citizens, or, at least, denizens. Although none of 
the States may allow them the privilege of offi  ce and suf-
frage, yet all other civil and conventional rights are se-
cured to them; at least, such rights were evidently secured 
to them by the ordinance in question for the government 
of Indiana. If these rights are vested in that or any other 
portion of the United States, can it be compatible with 
the spirit of our confederated Government to deny their 
existence in any other part? Is there less comity existing 
between State and State, or State and Territory, than ex-
ists between the despotic Governments of Europe?”
Th ese are the words of a learned and great judge, born and educated 
in a slave State. 
I now come to inquire, under the sixth and last head, “whether the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the question before us, 
are binding on this court.” 
While we respect the learning and high intelligence of the State 
courts, and consider their decisions, with others, as authority, we follow 
them only where they give a construction to the State statutes. On this 
head, I consider myself fortunate in being able to turn to the decision 
of this court, given by Mr. Justice Grier, in Pease v. Peck, a case from 
the State of Michigan, (18 Howard, 589,) decided in December term, 
1855. Speaking for the court, Judge Grier said: 
“We entertain the highest respect for that learned court, 
(the Supreme Court of Michigan,) and in any question 
aff ecting the construction of their own laws, where we 
entertain any doubt, would be glad to be relieved from 
doubt and responsibility by reposing on their decision. 
of Smith v. Smith, (13 Louisiana Rep., 441; Th omas v. Generis, Loui-
siana Rep., 483; Harry et al. v. Decker and Hopkins, Walker’s Missis-
sippi Rep., 36.) It was held that, “slaves within the jurisdiction of the 
Northwestern Territory became freemen by virtue of the ordinance of 
1787, and can assert their claim to freedom in the courts of Missis-
sippi.” (Griffi  th v. Fanny, 1 Virginia Rep., 143.) It was decided that a 
negro held in servitude in Ohio, under a deed executed in Virginia, is 
entitled to freedom by the Constitution of Ohio. 
Th e case of Rhodes v. Bell (2 Howard, 307; 15 Curtis, 152) in-
volved the main principle in the case before us. A person residing in 
Washington city purchased a slave in Alexandria, and brought him to 
Washington. Washington continued under the law of Maryland, Al-
exandria under the law of Virginia. Th e act of Maryland of Novem-
ber, 1796, (2 Maxcy’s Laws, 351,) declared any one who shall bring 
any negro, mulatto, or other slave, into Maryland, such slave should 
be free. Th e above slave, by reason of his being brought into Washing-
ton city, was declared by this court to be free. Th is, it appears to me, 
is a much stronger case against the slave than the facts in the case of 
Scott. 
In Bush v. White, (3 Monroe, 104,) the court say: 
“Th at the ordinance was paramount to the Territorial 
laws, and restrained the legislative power there as eff ec-
tually as a Constitution in an organized State. It was a 
public act of the Legislature of the Union, and a part of 
the supreme law of the land; and, as such, this court is as 
much bound to take notice of it as it can be of any other 
law.”
In the case of Rankin v. Lydia, before cited, Judge Mills, speaking 
for the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, says: 
“If, by the positive provision in our code, we can and must 
hold our slaves in the one case, and statutory provisions 
equally positive decide against that right in the other, and 
liberate the slave, he must, by an authority equally impe-
rious, be declared free. Every argument which supports 
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Th ere are, it is true, many dicta to be found in our de-
cisions, averring that the courts of the United States are 
bound to follow the decisions of the State courts on the 
construction of their own laws. But although this may be 
correct, yet a rather strong expression of a general rule, it 
cannot be received as the annunciation of a maxim of uni-
versal application. Accordingly, our reports furnish many 
cases of exceptions to it. In all cases where there is a set-
tled construction of the laws of the a State, by its high-
est judicature established by admitted precedent, it is the 
practice of the courts of the United States to receive and 
adopt it, without criticism or further inquiry. When the 
decisions of the State court are not consistent, we do not 
feel bound to follow the last, if it is contrary to our own 
convictions; and much more is this the case where, after a 
long course of consistent decisions, some new light sud-
denly springs up, or an excited public opinion has elicited 
new doctrines subversive of former safe precedent.”
Th ese words, it appears to me, have a stronger application to the 
case before us than they had to the cause in which they were spoken 
as the opinion of this court; and I regret that they do not seem to be 
as fresh in the recollection of some of my brethren as in my own. For 
twenty-eight years, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri 
were consistent on all the points made in this case. But this consistent 
course was suddenly terminated, whether by some new light suddenly 
springing up, or an excited public opinion, or both, it is not necessary 
to say. In the case of Scott v. Emerson, in 1852, they were overturned 
and repudiated. 
Th is, then, is the very case in which seven of my brethren declared 
they would not follow the last decision. On this authority I may well 
repose. I can desire no other or better basis. 
But there is another ground which I deem conclusive, and which I 
will re-state. 
Th e Supreme Court of Missouri refused to notice the act of Con-
gress or the Constitution of Illinois, under which Dred Scott, his wife 
and children, claimed that they are entitled to freedom. 
Th is being rejected by the Missouri court, there was no case before 
it, or least it was a case with only one side. And this is the case which, 
in the opinion of this court, we are bound to follow. Th e Missouri court 
disregards the express provisions of an act of Congress and the Consti-
tution of a sovereign State, both of which laws for twenty-eight years it 
had not only regarded, but carried into eff ect. 
If a State court may do this, on a question involving the liberty of a 
human being, what protection do the laws aff ord? So far from this be-
ing a Missouri question, it is a question, as it would seem, within the 
twenty-fi fth section of the judiciary act, where a right to freedom be-
ing set up under the act of Congress, and the decision being against 
such right, it may be brought for revision before this court, from the 
Supreme Court of Missouri. I think the judgment of the court below 
should be reversed. 
